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Abstract.
We propose a toy model for a stochastic description of the competition between
two athletes of unequal strength, whose average strength difference is represented by
a parameter d. The athletes interact through the choice of their strategies x, y ∈ [0, 1].
These variables denote the amount of energy each invests in the competition, and
determine the performance of each athlete. Each athlete picks his strategy based on
his knowledge of his own and his competitor’s performance distribution, and on his
evaluation of the danger of exhaustion, which increases with the amount of invested
energy. We formulate this problem as a zero-sum game. Mathematically it is in
the class of “discontinuous games” for which a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed
in advance. We demonstrate by explicit construction that the problem has a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium
(
f(x), g(y)
)
for arbitrary 0 < d < 1. The probability
distributions f and g appear to both be the sum of a continuous component and a
Dirac delta peak. It is remarkable that this problem is analytically tractable. The
Nash equilibrium provides both the weaker and the stronger athlete with the best
strategy to optimize their chances to win.
Keywords : Game theory; Stochastic processes; Exact results; Agent-based models
1. Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a growing use of the tools of statistical physics in
order to understand human systems involving a form of competition [1], for example
in a poker game [2], but also in sport (e.g. football [3], tennis [4, 5], baseball [6], or
sport competitions in general [7]). A natural framework for describing a competition
situation is provided by game theory. It has been applied, for example, to tournament
competitions [8], or to pedestrians competing for going through a bottleneck [9, 10].
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In this paper we focus on competition between two individual contestants that we
will refer to as athletes. Our description is general and could apply to numerous different
sports involving competition between individuals, such as swimming, cycling, rowing,
skying, speed-skating. For definiteness we will place ourselves in the setting of running
a race.
In the case of running, models at various levels of detail have been proposed to
describe the supply of energy, both through anaerobic and aerobic metabolisms, that
the athlete will be able to use during the race [11]. This energy supply, together with
other parameters such as the propulsive force or possible friction forces, will determine
a runners optimal velocity profile [12, 13, 14, 15] in the framework of optimal control
theory, with good agreement with real world observations.
In a competition, interactions of several types may occur between the runners. For
example, it seems that slipstreaming, well known for cycles, can also play a role in
middle-distance running. An easy way to model this effect in the frame of optimal
control is to assume that one of the athletes is running as if he were alone, and
to optimize the trajectory of the other runner under the effect of slipstreaming [16].
However this approach treats the two athletes on a different footing. It is possible
actually to propose models based on optimal control for which both trajectories are
optimized simultaneously [17]. In any case, the solution (not necessarily unique) will be
deterministic.
In reality the outcome of a race is uncertain due to the randomness of circumstances
beyond the runners’ control. In the present paper we therefore introduce a stochastic
model for a two-runner race, in which stochasticity can be seen as a modeling of the level
of fatigue or motivation that can vary from one race to the next. We aim at presenting
an exactly solvable model that illustrates principles, rather than retaining full realism.
In our toy model, both runners are treated on equal footing. In particular, both are free
to mutually adapt their strategies, and each of them does so with the purpose of winning
as many races as possible. The stochasticity in the description opens in particular the
possibility for the weaker athlete to win with a certain probability. The model will take
the form of a game and we will therefore be able to apply the tools of game theory,
whose essential points we will recall as we go along.
Assuming that the same two runners compete through a large number of races, we
will find analytically a Nash equilibrium, that is a set of strategies such that none of the
runners can increase his gain by changing unilaterally his strategy. We will show that
in order to reach this Nash equilibrium, runners should not run all races the same way,
but rather use mixed strategies so as to surprise their competitor.
In section 2 we define the model and express it in a form amenable to a game
theoretic solution. In section 3 we show that if the model has a Nash equilibrium,
this equilibrium consists necessarily of mixed strategies. In section 4 we briefly recall
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the symmetric case, well-known in the literature, in which the athletes are of equal
strength. In section 5 we derive the main results of our work. We consider a weaker
and a stronger athlete and show how this changes the nature of the symmetric solution.
The full asymmetric solution is calculated analytically and commented upon. In section
6 we conclude and discuss some future perspectives.
2. A two-athlete model
2.1. Running times and energies
We consider two runners R1 and R2. For each race, we associate with Ri a variable Ei
(i = 1, 2), that we will refer to as his energy. When runner Ri has an energy Ei, he will
complete the race within his best final time T (Ei), which we stipulate to be a decreasing
function of its argument.
The introduction of this “energy”variable requires a short discussion. The runner’s
best final time depends on several parameters, including various types of energy supplies
(anaerobic, VO2‡) but also other physiological characteristics such as his maximal
propulsive force or his friction coefficient. We refer to [14, 13, 15] for an analysis of
how the final time depends on these parameters individually. The “energy” Ei should
be thought of as describing the integrated effect of all these parameters, in the spirit of
the invested stamina introduced in [8]. Actually the variable Ei could also simply be
thought of as a way to parametrize the distribution of final times.
For each race, the energy Ei available to runner Ri is taken to be an independent
stochastic variable drawn from a probability distribution ρi(Ei). Each runner has a
knowledge of the two energy distributions ρi (i = 1, 2) and thus knows in particular
whether on average he is stronger or weaker than his opponent. But on a given race,
he can only make a guess about the actual random values Ei (i = 1, 2) of the energies
that are going to be available to himself and his opponent. Runner Ri will therefore
choose a value ǫi (his “strategy”) as a guess for the energy he expects to have available
for this particular race.
Two scenarios are then possible. Either Ri overestimated the energy available
to himself (ǫi > Ei) and he will be exhausted before reaching the finish line; or he
underestimated it (ǫi ≤ Ei) and he will finish the race in a time T (ǫi). The probability
of exhaustion associated with the choice of strategy ǫi is thus
P exhi =
∫ ǫi
−∞
ρi(Ei) dEi ≡
{
x, i = 1,
y, i = 2.
(1)
It is now clear how the interaction between runners comes into play. If a runner
knows that he runs against a stronger competitor, he will tend to choose a higher ǫi in
‡ The VO2 is the rate at which oxygen is transformed into energy.
Nash equilibrium in a stochastic model of two competing athletes 4
(   )Eρ1ρ2(   )E
+1d0 d 1 E
Figure 1. The energy distributions ρ1(E) and ρ2(E) of runners R1 and R2.
order to realize a shorter time T (ǫi), in spite of the increased risk of failing by exhaustion.
If he knows he runs against a weaker opponent, he will choose a lower ǫi in order to
reduce his risk of exhaustion.
Our term “exhaustion” should be understood in a broad sense. Indeed, in the same
way as the variable Ei represents the aggregation of several parameters, “exhaustion”
also covers a variety of situations. For example, a lack of concentration can lead to a
false start, athletes may suffer from various injuries, etc. Besides, exhaustion does not
necessarily mean that the runner does not reach the finish line, but that he would do
it (if at all) with a final time far less than the best time he could have expected (at
least less than any best time T (Ei) that the other runner can achieve). There are (rare)
examples in the sport history where a weaker competitor indeed won a competition
because other ones were eliminated for various reasons. For example, in the Olympic
Games of Sydney in 2000, one Guinean swimmer won a race though it was the first time
he was swimming in a 50 meter swimming pool, just because the other ones both made
false starts [18].
We finally observe that this simplified model does not take into account any
interactions between the two runners that might occur during the race. Such more
difficult questions are left for follow-up work.
2.2. Choice of the energy distributions ρi(Ei)
To simplify the calculations we will take for each ρi(Ei) a uniform energy distribution
on a unit interval. This interval will be d ≤ E1 ≤ d + 1 for runner R1 and 0 ≤ E2 ≤ 1
for runner R2, as shown in Figure 1. For d = 0 there is symmetry between the two
runners; for d > 0 runner R1 is the stronger one. Except when stated otherwise, we will
consider only the case 0 ≤ d < 1, for which the weaker runner still has a nonvanishing
probability to win. The case d ≥ 1 is trivial in the sense that the stronger runner will
always win.
For each race a stochastic variable Ei (unknown to the runners) is chosen for each
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Exhausted runners Probability Winner
none (1-P exh1 )(1 − P exh2 ) if ǫ1 > ǫ2 : R1
if ǫ2 > ǫ1 : R2
if ǫ1 = ǫ2 : R1 with probability
1
2(1 + γ0)
R2 with probability
1
2(1− γ0)
R2 only (1− P exh1 )P exh2 R1
R1 only P
exh
1 (1− P exh2 ) R2
both P exh1 P
exh
2 R1 , R2 with equal probability
Table 1. Race winner shown in four different cases of exhaustion and relative values
of the ǫi. The physical variables P
exh
1
, P exh
2
, ǫ1, and ǫ2 may all be expressed in terms
of x and y with the aid of Eq. (2).
runner according to its distribution ρi. When we apply (1) for given guesses ǫi of the
energies, we find that§
P exh1 = x = ǫ1 − d, P exh2 = y = ǫ2 . (2)
Hence the choice of the strategy pair (ǫ1, ǫ2) is equivalent to the choice of the pair (x, y);
since both x and y vary in the unit interval, these will be the most convenient variables
for the calculations in later sections.
2.3. The resulting game
For a given strategy pair (ǫ1, ǫ2) the possible outcomes of the race are listed in Table
1 together with their probabilities of occurrence. Four cases (first column of the table)
must be distinguished, according to whether none, only R1, only R2, or both runners
are exhausted before reaching the finish line. These cases occur with the probabilities
listed in the second column of the table, and the winner is given by the third column.
Indeed, when both runners reach the finish line without being exhausted, the winner
is the one with the shorter time T (ǫi), hence the larger energy ǫi; in case ǫ1 = ǫ2,
which is most of the time of measure zero as we shall see later, the winner is chosen
randomly with probabilities 1
2
(1±γ0) where, we introduced γ0 ∈ [−1, 1] as an additional
parameter of the problem for reasons that will become clear later. When only one of
the runners is exhausted, the other one wins. When both are exhausted, the winner is
chosen uniformly randomly. There thus is always a winner and a loser. We now model
this race as a game by assigning a payoff +1 to the winner and −1 to the loser, which
means that we have a zero-sum game. For a given strategy pair (ǫ1, ǫ2) the expected
payoff for R1, to be denoted as G1(ǫ1 − d, ǫ2) = G1(x, y), is obtained as the sum on the
§ Here exhaustion would mean that either the runner does not reach the finish line, or that it does
so within a running time which is larger that the largest T (E) of the other runner, i.e. T (ǫ = 0) or
T (ǫ = d).
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probabilities for the four cases listed in Table 1, each weighted with ±1 according to
whether runner R1 is or is not the winner. Upon using Eq. (2) to express all quantities
in terms of the variables x and y we find
0 1
1
d
y
x
region II
region I
Figure 2. The payoff function G1(x, y), defined on the unit square, is
discontinuous along the dashed line separating regions I and II.
G1(x, y) =


−1 + 2y − xy, x+ d < y (region II),
1− 2x+ xy, x+ d > y (region I),
d+ γ(x), x+ d = y,
(3)
with (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 and in which
γ(x) = γ0 (1− x)(1 − x− d) (4)
defines the payoff on the line of discontinuity. For γ0 = 0 this payoff takes the value d,
halfway between the neighboring values in the regions I and II (see Figure 2). For γ0 = 1
[for γ0 = −1] the value d + γ(x) is equal to the limit of G1(x, y) as the discontinuity is
approached in region I [in region II], so that G1 is upper (lower) semi-continuous.
Since the race is a zero-sum game, the expected gain G2(y, x) of runner R2 is
G2(y, x) = −G1(x, y). (5)
Eq. (3) together with (5) defines the “game.”
We will now address the question of determining the best strategies for R1 and R2
if each wants to maximize his payoff. This is the subject of the next sections.
3. Nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies
Having defined the game (3), we now ask what the best strategy is for each runner and
will appeal to game theory to find the answer.
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In general, a strategy will be mixed, that is, each time the race is repeated, runner
R1 chooses an x from a distribution f(x) and runner R2 a y from a distribution g(y).
A pure strategy is the special case in which a runner always chooses the same x = x0
or y = y0 (hence f or g is a Dirac delta function). A Nash equilibrium is a pair of
strategies (f(x), g(y)) such that neither runner can improve his payoff by a unilateral
change of strategy. A general game may have no such equilibrium, or a unique one, or
several.
We will now show that (3) does not have a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies. For
a zero-sum game, game theory tells us that a Nash equilibrium coincides with a minimax
solution. The idea of a minimax solution is that each player will try to minimize his
worst-case loss, or equivalently that he will try to maximize his worst-case gain. When
we restrict ourselves to pure strategies, this means that runner R1 will play the strategy
x∗ that ensures he will win at least G∗1 = maxx [miny G1(x, y)] and runner R2 will play
the strategy y∗ that ensures he will lose at most −G∗2 = miny [maxxG1(x, y)]. If G∗1 and
G∗2 exist, then necessarily
G∗1 = max
x
min
y
G1(x, y) ≤ min
y
max
x
G1(x, y) = −G∗2 (6)
If, moreover, for a pair (x∗, y∗) of strategies Eq. (6) holds as an equality, then this pair
is a minimax solution and is also a Nash equilibrium. Inversely, if there exists a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, then G∗1 and G
∗
2 should both exist and be equal.
For our present problem, and for 0 ≤ d < 1, one shows with the aid of a short
calculation that
sup
x
inf
y
G1(x, y) = d−∆, (7)
inf
y
sup
x
G1(x, y) = d+∆, ∆ ≡ 3−
√
8 + d2, (8)
which excludes the possibility for Eq. (6) to be satisfied with the equality sign. Hence
we see that there cannot be a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies‖. We have relegated
the proof of (8) to Appendix A, where we show that the extrema are reached at the
point (x∗, x∗ + d) with x∗ = (4 − d − √8 + d2)/2, located on the line of discontinuity,
and that the difference 2∆ between the two expressions in (8) is equal to the jump of
G1 across the discontinuity in that point.
In the absence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the next step is to look for
one with mixed strategies. The fact that in our game there is a discontinuity will
turn out to be mathematically essential and we will therefore treat the line x + d = y
‖ In the case d ≥ 1, the stronger runner will always win. Then a trivial Nash equilibrium is obtained
when the stronger runner plays the pure strategy f(x) = δ(x). Any strategy of the weaker runner will
lead to the same payoff G2 = −G1 = −1. Thus an infinity of strategies g(y) can be chosen which all
lead to a Nash equilibrium.
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discontinuity with the care required. Glicksberg’s theorem (as cited by [19]) guarantees
the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a discontinuous game only if G1(x, y) is upper
or lower semicontinuous. The game (3) lacks this property for all γ0 ∈ (−1, 1), but we
will show by explicit construction that it nevertheless does have a Nash equilibrium.
4. Symmetric problem
We take in this section d = 0, so that we have two runners of equal strength, R1 and
R2, with respective strategies x, y ∈ [0, 1]. The (positive or negative) gain of R1 is given
by the payoff function
G1(x, y) =


−1 + 2y − xy, x < y,
1− 2x+ xy, x > y,
γ0(1− x)2, x = y,
(9)
and the gain of R2 is the opposite, G2(y, x) = −G1(x, y). This game (with γ0 = 0)
is a classical textbook example [20]. We briefly recall how its Nash equilibrium is
obtained. Since we found in section 3 that this problem has no Nash equilibrium of
pure strategies, we will now look for one in which R1 and R2 have mixed strategies with
identical distributions f(x) and f(y), respectively, that satisfy
f(z) ≥ 0,
∫ 1
0
dz f(z) = 1. (10)
The support of f(z) may be smaller than the full interval [0, 1]. One may try to solve
the problem by supposing that the support is an interval [0, a] with an as yet unknown
a ∈ (0, 1).
If runner R1 chooses a strategy x in the support of f(x), then his expected payoff
averaged over R2’s mixed strategy f(y) will be
G1[x; f(y)] =
∫ a
0
dy G1(x, y)f(y). (11)
As a consequence of the definition of a Nash equilibrium, the mixed strategy f(y)
that we are looking for should be such that
G1[x; f(y)] = K, 0 ≤ x ≤ a, (12)
where K is some constant. Indeed, if a specific strategy x = x0 would yield a payoff
less than K to runner R1, then R1 would remove that x0 from the support of f(x);
and if a specific strategy x = x0 would yield a payoff larger than K to runner R1, then
R1 could improve his expected payoff by putting a larger weight on that x0 – both in
contradiction with the definition of a Nash equilibrium. By symmetry we must of course
in the end find K = 0, but we have not needed that here.
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It is not a priori clear how many solutions there are to (12), if any at all. We will
look for an f that is differentiable. When we substitute (11) in (12), use the explicit
expression (9) for the payoff function, and differentiate twice with respect to x, there
arises a first order ODE for f(y) whose solution is
f(y) =
D(a)
(1− y)3 , 0 ≤ y ≤ a. (13)
Normalization yields D as a function of the hypothesized interval parameter a,
D(a) =
2(1− a)2
a(2− a) . (14)
In order to determine a we substitute (13) in the original expression (12), which leads
to
K =
(3a− 2)D
2(1− a)2 [a− (2− a)x] , 0 ≤ x ≤ a. (15)
We should now render the RHS of (15) independent of x. As a cannot be equal to 2
(we have a < 1), the only way this condition can be met is when the prefactor 3a − 2
vanishes. Then K = 0 as expected and a = 2
3
, which combined with (14) yields D = 1
4
.
The resulting function f(x) = 1/[4(1 − x)3] is shown in Figure 3. To make sure that
it actually represents a Nash equilibrium, one also has to show that neither runner can
improve his result by choosing a strategy outside of the support [0, a]. This is easily
done [20]. Finally we observe that the value of G1(x, y) on the discontinuity line has
played no role here: the equilibrium is independent of γ0.
5. Asymmetric problem
The case of asymmetric runners has not so far been studied, and doing so is the purpose
of this work. The question of whether a discontinuous game has or does not have a
Nash equilibrium is the subject of several mathematical theorems, but has not received
an exhaustive answer. Glicksberg’s theorem applies here only for γ0 = ±1. We don’t
know either whether the solution is unique. We will show below that for the problem
at hand such a solution does exist by calculating it explicitly. It is remarkable that this
problem may be solved analytically exactly, as there is no general method allowing to
systematically find Nash equilibria.
5.1. The asymmetric problem and the ansatz for its solution
For an asymmetry parameter d > 0 defined in section 2.3 the payoff function G1(x, y)
that gives runner R1’s gain is given by the general expression Eq. (3), which we repeat
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x
0
2
4
6
8
f(x)
Figure 3. The function f(x) representing the Nash equilibrium for the
symmetric problem, d = 0. Here a = 23 .
here for easy reference,
G1(x, y) =


−1 + 2y − xy, x+ d < y,
1− 2x+ xy, x+ d > y,
d+ γ(x), x+ d = y.
(16)
The gain of runner R2 is again equal to R1’s loss, that is, G2(y, x) = −G1(x, y). We
note that the payoff function (16) differs from the one of the symmetric case, Eq. (9),
only by a parallel shift of the line of discontinuity. In this case we have to solve the
full asymmetric game, that is, assume that runners R1 and R2 have distinct strategies
f(x) and g(y), respectively. Their expected gains G1[x; g(y)] and G2[y; f(x)] have the
expressions
G1[x; g(y)] =
∫
supp g
dy G1(x, y)g(y), (17)
G2[y; f(x)] =
∫
supp f
dxG2(x, y)f(x). (18)
and we must consider the pair of equations
G1[x; g(y)] = K, x ∈ supp f, (19)
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G2[y; f(x)] = −K, y ∈ supp g. (20)
As R1 is now stronger than R2, we anticipate that K > 0.
There is no general method to determine f and g. In the preceding section we
assumed that the solution f = g was differentiable, and it appeared that indeed such
a solution existed; but this need not always be the case. In the asymmetric case two
arguments can help us to guess the forms of f and g. First, the solution to the symmetric
problem given above suggests that f and g will at least each have a differentiable
component, in addition to anything else. Secondly, we have used the online solver
of Avis et al. [21] to obtain the exact Nash equilibrium for a version of the system in
which each strategy was confined to a set of fifteen discrete points, with the points of
the two sets alternating along the axis.
Inspired by these considerations we decided to look for strategies f(x) and g(y)
that both have a differentiable component and, at the lower end of the allowed strategy
interval, a Dirac delta peak. That is, we make the ansatz
f(x) = q1δ(x) + (1− q1)fc(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (21)
g(y) = q2δ(y) + (1− q2)gc(y), 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, (22)
where fc and gc are differentiable and have their support on an interval ǫ1, ǫ2 ∈ (d, d+a],
that is common to both runners on the original energy axis. Here again, the interval
length a is as yet unknown but should be such that 0 < a ≤ 1 − d. In terms of the
variables x and y this “common” interval is given by
0 < x ≤ a, d < y ≤ d+ a. (23)
Hence
fc(x), gc(y) > 0,
∫ a
0
dx fc(x) =
∫ d+a
d
dy gc(y) = 1. (24)
A schematic representation of the space of possible strategies is given in Figure 4.
5.2. Determining fc(x), gc(y), q1, q2, and the interval length a
We proceed to find a pair of strategies f(x) and g(y) having the hypothesized form
(21)-(22).
Upon substituting Eqs. (21) and (22) in Eqs. (18) and (17), respectively, we obtain
G1[x; g(y)] = q2G1(x, 0) + (1− q2)
∫ d+a
d
dy G1(x, y)gc(y),
0 ≤ x ≤ a (25)
and, using the zero-sum property (5) to eliminate G2 in favor of G1 ,
G2[y; f(x)] = − q1G1(0, y)− (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dxG1(x, y)fc(x),
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1−d
x
y
0 1
1
a
d+a
d
f(x)
g(y)
Figure 4. The space of possible strategies is the unit square. The payoff
function G1(x, y) is discontinuous along the dashed line parallel to the diagonal.
The Nash equilibrium is a pair (f(x), g(x)). The heavy red line, when projected
vertically onto the x axis, gives the support of f(x); similarly, the heavy blue
one, when projected horizontally onto the y axis, gives the support of g(y). The
red and blue circles denote the location of Dirac delta function components.
The one of g(y) is isolated from the rest of its support. The effectively used
strategy pairs (x, y) in the Nash equilibrium are limited, therefore, to the
subspace [0, a] ×
(
{0} ∪ (d, d + a]
)
that has been shaded and consists of a
square and a line interval.
y = 0 or d < y ≤ d+ a. (26)
On the RHS of these equations the contribution of the Dirac deltas are respectively
G1(x, 0) = 1 and G1(0, y) = −1 + 2y. In the integrals appearing in Eqs. (25)-(26), we
now use the explicit expression (16) for G1(x, y). This leads to splitting both intervals
of integration into two subintervals separated by a point of discontinuity at x + d = y.
The value G1(x, x + d) = d + γ(x) of the payoff at the discontinuity has zero weight
under the integrals and does not affect the outcome. Note that in Eq. (26) the particular
value y = d, which is outside the support of g(y), is excluded. As a consequence the
value of the payoff on the line of discontinuity has not so far appeared in any of our
considerations.
When differentiating (25) twice with respect to x and (26) twice with respect to y,
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we find for fc(x) and gc(y) the linear first order ODEs
f ′c(x) =
3− d− 3x
(1− x)(1 − d− x)fc(x), g
′
c(y) =
3 + d− 3y
(1− y)(1 + d− y)gc(y), (27)
in which the parameters q1, q2, and K no longer appear. The solutions are
fc(x) =
B(a)
(1− d− x)2(1− x) , 0 < x ≤ a, (28)
gc(y) =
D(a)
(1 + d− y)2(1− y) , d < y ≤ d+ a, (29)
and vanish outside the intervals indicated. Normalization yields D and B in terms of
the interval length a,
D−1(a) = L(a)− a
d(1− a) , (30)
B−1(a) = − L(a) + a
d(1− d)(1− d− a) , (31)
with the abbreviation
L(a) = 1
d2
log
(1− d)(1− a)
1− d− a . (32)
Figure 5 shows the functions f(x) and g(y) of Eqs. (21)-(22) with fc(x) and gc(y) given
by (28)-(29) for the special case of asymmetry parameter d = 1
3
and with a, q1, and q2
having the values that will be determined below.
At this stage the unknown parameters are a, q1, q2, and K, the last three of which
have been eliminated by the differentiations carried out above. To determine these we
have to substitute the solutions (28) and (29) in the original equations (26) and (25)
and then impose (19) and (20).
5.2.1. Substitution in (26). Once (28) has been substituted in (26) and the integrals
have been carried out explicitly, we find that G1[x; g(y)] becomes a linear expression in
x. The equality G1[x; g(y)] = K then leads to two conditions from which q2 and K may
be solved in terms of a. The result is
q2 =
AD
AD − 1 (33)
with
AD =
1
2
− (2− a)D
2(1− a) , (34)
and
K = 1− (1− q2) 2aD
1− a . (35)
When (33) together with (34) is substituted in (35), this yields an expression for K
solely in terms of a, the normalization constant D whose a dependence is given by (30),
and the asymmetry parameter d.
Nash equilibrium in a stochastic model of two competing athletes 14
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 a+dd
ε1 , ε2
0
2
4
6
8
10
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g(ε2)
Figure 5. The two strategies for asymmetry parameter d = 13 as functions of
the energies ǫ1 = x+ d and ǫ2 = y. Each vertical bars represents the value of
the integrated delta function at that point, multiplied by 100. The continuous
components of the strategies are fc(x) (red curve) and gc(y) (blue curve). The
right hand limit point of the support is at a+ d = 0.4743799 + 13 = 0.8077132.
5.2.2. Substitution in (25). Once (29) has been substituted in (25) and the integrals
have been carried out explicitly, we similarly find that G2[y; f(x)] becomes a linear
expression in y. The equality G2[y; f(x)] = −K then leads to two conditions from which
q1 and K may be solved in terms of a. A third condition arises from the requirement
that also for y = 0 we must have G2[0; f(x)] = −K. It turns out, however, that this
third condition is satisfied when the former two are. The result is
q1 =
AB
AB + 1
(36)
with
AB = −1
2
+
B(2− 2d− a)
2(1− d)(1− d− a) , (37)
and
K = 2d− 1− (1− q1)
[
d− (2− d)aB
(1− d)(1− d− a)
]
. (38)
When (36) together with (37) is substituted in (38), this yields again an expression for
K solely in terms of a, the normalization constant B whose a dependence is given by
(31), and the asymmetry parameter d.
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5.2.3. Combining the two substitutions. The interval length a is fixed by the condition
that the two expressions for K, (35) and (38), be equal. After division by BD this
condition takes the form
2a(2− d− a)
(1− d)(1− a)(1− d− a) +
a
(1− d)(1− d− a)
1
D
− 2
B
− 1
BD
= 0. (39)
Upon substituting in (39) the explicit results (30)-(31) for D−1 and B−1 we obtain a
quadratic expression in the logarithm L(a) of Eq. (32) with coefficients that are ratios of
low-degree polynomials in a and d. One may show by tedious work that this expression
can be factorized and that (39) reduces to[
(1− a)dL(a)− a
][
(1− d− a)dL(a)− (2d+ 1)a− 2d(d− 1)
]
= 0. (40)
The first factor in (40) does not have a zero in the interval 0 < a < 1 − d. It thus
appears that the “physical” solution is obtained by setting the second factor equal to
zero. The resulting equation, slightly rewritten and exponentiated, becomes
−e−(2d2+1) = −(1 − d)(1− a)
1− d− a e
−
(1−d)(1−a)
1−d−a , (41)
which is of the form Y = XeX with Y = − exp (−(2d2+1)) andX = −(1−d)(1−a)/(1−
d− a). The solution is X =W(Y ) where W is the Lambert function. For negative X ,
as is our case, it has two branches, W0 and W−1; requiring that 0 < a < 1− d leads us
to identify the “−1” branch as the “physical” one. Hence we have
−(1− d)(1− a)
1− d− a =W−1(− e
−(2d2+1))
≡ − w , (42)
where the second line defines w. The number w is positive and as d varies it is in the
interval w ∈ [−W−1(−e−1),−W−1(−e−3)] = [1, 4.505241], the lower and upper limits
occurring for d = 0 and d = 1, respectively. Eq. (42) now shows that the hitherto
unknown interval length a is given by the elegant expression
a =
(1− d)(1− w)
1− d− w . (43)
Figure 6 shows the behavior of a as a function of d. It appears that for d→ 0 the solution
of the symmetric problem with a = 2/3 is recovered. Figure 7 shows the expected gain
K of runner R1 as a function of d. The values K = 0 and K = 1 correspond to runner
R1 winning with probability
1
2
and 1, respectively. The increase with d appears to be
almost, but not completely, linear. Figure 8 shows the coefficients (integrated values) q1
and q2 of the delta peaks in the strategies, as a function of the asymmetry parameter d.
For d→ 0 the amplitudes of the delta functions vanish and the solution of the symmetric
problem is recovered. Figure 5 shows, for the special value d = 1
3
, the strategies f(x)
and g(y) that are the main result of this report. We have plotted them as functions of
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the energies ǫ1 = x + d and ǫ2 = y. Each strategy consists of a continuous part and a
Dirac delta. The delta functions have been presented as vertical bars of height equal
to 100 times their integrated value in the corresponding point, viz. x = 0 for f(x) and
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
d
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
a
a /(1-d)
a+d
Figure 6. Interval length a, scaled interval length a/(1− d), and the sum a+ d
as a function of the asymmetry parameter d.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
d
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
K
straight line
Figure 7. Expected gain K of runner R1 (the stronger one) as a function of
the asymmetry parameter d. The dotted straight line is shown for comparison.
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Figure 8. Coefficients q1 and q2 of the Dirac deltas in Eqs. (21) and (22) as
functions of the asymmetry parameter d.
y = −1
3
for g(y).
In summary, we found a pair of functions f(x) and g(y) given by Eqs. (21) and (22),
(28)-(32) for fc(x) and gc(y), Eqs. (33)-(34) and (36)-(37) for the parameters q2 and q1,
respectively, in which finally the interval length a is fixed by Eqs. (42)-(43).
5.3. Completing the proof
In order to complete the proof that this pair is a Nash equilibrium, we have to show
that neither player can improve his gain by choosing a strategy outside of the support
of the functions (f(x) for R1 and g(y) for R2) obtained above. That is, we must show
that
G1[x; g(y)] ≤ K, x /∈ supp f, (44)
G2[y; f(x)] ≤ −K, y /∈ supp g, (45)
which complement Eqs. (19)-(20). We will prove Eqs. (44)-(45) below.
Let us first consider runner R1 and suppose that he chooses a strategy x ∈ (a, 1].
Then his expected gain is
G1[x; g(y)] = q2G1(x, 0) + (1− q2)
∫ a+d
d
dy G1(x, y)gc(y)
= q2(1− 2x) + (1− q2)
∫ a+d
d
dy (1− 2x+ xy)gc(y), (46)
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where the expression for G1(x, y) is a consequence of the fact that here x > a and
y ≤ a + d, whence x+ d > y. Figure 4 is helpful to visualize these various inequalities.
Expression (46) is clearly strictly decreasing with x and therefore
G1[x; g(y)] < G1[a; g(y)] = K for x ∈ (a, 1], (47)
which means that (44) is satisfied.
Let us next consider runner R2. Three cases may occur.
Case 1. If R2 chooses a strategy y ∈ (a + d, 1], his expected gain is
G2[y; f(x)] = − q1G1(0, y)− (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dxG1(x, y)fc(x)
= q1(1− 2y) + (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dx (1− 2y + xy)fc(x), (48)
where the expression for G1(x, y) is a consequence of the fact that here x ≤ a and
y > a + d, whence x + d < y. Expression (48) is clearly strictly decreasing with y and
therefore
G2[y; f(x)] < G2[a+ d; f(x)] = −K for y ∈ (a+ d, 1]. (49)
This means that (45) is satisfied for y ∈ (a+ d, 1].
Case 2. If R2 chooses a strategy y ∈ (0, d), his expected gain is
G2[y; f(x)] = − q1G1(0, y)− (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dxG1(x, y)fc(x)
= − q1 − (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dx (1− 2x+ xy)fc(x), (50)
where the expression for G1(x, y) is a consequence of the fact that here x ≥ 0 and y < d,
whence x+ d > y. Expression (50) is clearly strictly decreasing with y and therefore
G2[y; f(x)] < G2[0; f(x)] = −K for y ∈ (0, d), (51)
and so (45) is also satisfied for y ∈ (0, d).
Case 3. If R2 chooses the strategy y = d, his expected gain is still given by the
first line of (50), but now with G1(0, d) = γ(0) since (0, d) is on the line of discontinuity.
Hence
G2[d; f(x)] = −q1(d+ γ(0))− (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dxG1(x, d)fc(x). (52)
We now consider Eq. (26), which holds for y > d. When taking the limit y → d and
using that limy→dG(0, y) = −1 + 2d, we obtain
lim
y→d
G2[y; f(x)] = q1(1− 2d)− (1− q1)
∫ a
0
dxG1(x, d)fc(x) = −K. (53)
By comparing (52) and (53) we see that
G2[d; f(x)] = −K − (1− d+ γ(0))q1 ≤ −K, (54)
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where in the last step we used that 0 ≤ 1 − d − γ(0) = (1 + γ0)(1 − d). So (45) is also
satisfied for y = d.
Note that for γ0 = −1 the inequality in Eq. (53) holds with the equality sign and
we may in that case include the boundary point y = d in the support of gc(y).
The combined results of these three cases demonstrate that neither player can
improve his gain by employing a strategy that is outside the support that we found for
him, and this means our solution is a Nash equilibrium.
5.4. Limits d→ 0 and d→ 1
We observed numerically in Figures 6, 7, and 8 that in the limit d→ 0, we recover the
symmetric results. We shall now find analytically how this limit case is approached.
In order to recover the Nash equilibrium of the symmetric case we have to let d → 0
in Eq. (43). The small d behavior of w requires the expansion of the Lambert function
about its branch point ¶, which leads to
w = 1 + 2d+
4
3
d2 +
11
9
d3 +O(d4). (55)
When substituted in (43) we find that
a =
2
3
(
1− 7
9
d+O(d2)
)
, (56)
which for d = 0 reproduces the value found in section 4. To find the corresponding small
d expansions of q1 and q2 , the most convenient way of doing is to first expand (30) and
(31) for small d at fixed a, which leads to a cancelation of the terms proportional to
d−1, and to then insert (56). The result is that
D−1(a) = 4
(
1− 4
3
d+O(d2)
)
, B−1(a) = 4
(
1 +
5
6
d+O(d2)
)
. (57)
Upon combining this expansion of D−1(a) with (34) and (33), and the one of B−1(a)
with (37) and (36) we find a small-asymmetry behavior of the delta peak strengths,
q2 =
1
12
d+O(d2), q1 = 1
4
d+O(d2). (58)
When the expansions of q2 and D are substituted in (35), or, alternatively, those of q1
and B in (38), we find that in the small d limit the expected gain K of runner R1 is
given by
K =
13
12
d+O(d2), (59)
which explains the very small deviation of K from a straight line in Figure 7.
¶ The full expansion is given by Corless et al. [22], Eq. (4.22).
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In the limit d → 1 the interval [0, 1 − d] tends to zero and so necessarily a → 0.
However, we find that the limit
lim
d→1
a
1− d = 1 + 1/W−1(−e
−3) = 0.778036 (60)
corresponds to a finite value, as can also be seen in Fig. 6. It is clear from this limit
behavior that a stays away from the end points of the interval [0, 1− d].
6. Conclusion
We have introduced a model which describes the competition between two athletes who
have a difference of average strength described by a parameter d.
The athletes (R1 and R2) interact through their choice of a strategy (x and y,
respectively), which is essentially the amount of energy they invest in the competition.
The choice of a strategy is based on their knowledge of each other’s average performance
and their evaluation of the danger of exhaustion, which increases with the amount of
invested energy.
We have formulated this problem as a zero-sum game. The symmetric version of the
problem, d = 0, is well-known in the game theory literature and has a Nash equilibrium
in which both athletes optimize their chances for victory by adopting mixed strategies.
We have studied here the asymmetric game, d > 0. Mathematically, this problem
is in the class of “discontinuous games” and the existence of a Nash equilibrium is not
guaranteed in advance. We have first shown that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. We have then demonstrated by explicit construction that the problem has
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for arbitrary 0 < d < 1. For each athlete the best
mixed strategy appears to be the sum of a continuous distribution and a Dirac delta
peak. It is remarkable that this problem is analytically tractable. We have not addressed
the question of the uniqueness of the solution that we have found; but our numerical
work leads us to believe that it is unique.
Our solution shows in particular that, in the case where the energy distributions
have an overlap (0 < d < 1), the weaker athlete has a nonvanishing chance to win against
the stronger one, as expected, and provides him with the best strategy. In particular,
according to our results, the weaker athlete should sometimes choose a very cautious
strategy (corresponding to the Dirac peak at y = 0), so as to benefit of any misfortune
(injuries, false start, etc) of the stronger runner. Real sport competitions [18] provide
examples, albeit rare ones, of such events. In our model, this effect is overemphasized due
to the sharp distinction between optimal running and exhaustion. In real competitions,
there is a continuous transition between these two states, that could be included in
further modeling.
In this paper, we have considered that both runners have the same knowledge about
their own energy distribution and the one of their competitor. In practice, a runner has
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a better knowledge of his own. However, due to the fact that we have a sharp transition
between exhaustion and optimal running, taking a narrower distribution for one’s own
energy distribution would not deeply change the results.
In future work, several directions of research could be explored.
As we discussed in the paper, what we call energy is rather an aggregation of several
parameters. These parameters could be explicitly considered. Then it would be possible
for example that one athlete would be stronger in terms of anaerobic energy but weaker
in terms of VO2 (in any case, we could still define the stronger athlete as the one having
the shortest time when running alone). However, it will probably be quite difficult to
handle analytically a model with more energy variables.
In the present model, once a runner has chosen his strategy through the choice of
an energy on which he will count, he runs as if he were alone. An important step would
be to consider a race time that itself depends on both athletes, allowing to include some
interaction effect during the race.
As mentioned earlier, though we have presented our model in the framework of
athletics’ running, other types of competitions could be considered. For some of them
(for example shot put or long jumps), the time variable T (Ei) should be replaced by
a length. However this would not change the results that we have obtained in the
very general framework proposed in this paper. The model should become more sport
dependent when describing in a more refined way how T depends on the different
physiological characteristics of the athlete, or when considering interactions between
the athletes during the competition itself.
Implicitly, in our choice for the expression of the payoff, we assume that each athlete
wants to minimize the number of competitions that he loses. This may not necessarily
be the case. For example, a runner could prefer to have a few brilliant victories (meaning
that he would arrive much in advance compared to the other athletes), even if this means
losing more races. Then the gain should be written in a way that reflects the goal that
the athlete is trying to achieve.
Beyond these variants around our model, which are all static models, another
perspective would be to consider a differential game [23], i.e., a game in which some
time evolution is included, to describe how athletes adapt their strategy throughout the
race. Though analytical solutions will then be out of reach, it could be very instructive
to explore various types of strategies in this framework.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Rida Laraki for pointing out relevant literature to us and for
valuable remarks.
C.A.-R. acknowledges support for traveling from CNRS (De´fi S2C3 - AAP2017,
Nash equilibrium in a stochastic model of two competing athletes 22
project GAMEPED).
Appendix A. Proof of Eq. (8)
We wish to calculate supx infy G1(x, y) and infy supxG1(x, y). We consider here the
latter. To calculate supxG1(x, y) we distinguish two different y intervals, namely
0 ≤ y < d and d ≤ y ≤ 1. For 0 ≤ y < d we have, using expression (3) for G1(x, y),
sup
x
G1(x, y) = sup
x
(1− 2x+ xy) = 1, 0 ≤ y < d, (A.1)
there being a maximum for x = x∗(y) = 0. For d ≤ y ≤ 1 we begin by calculating supx
separately for 0 ≤ x < y−d, x = y−d, and y−d < x ≤ 1, and then take the maximum
of the three results. This yields, again with the aid of (3),
sup
x
G1(x, y) = max
[
sup
0≤x<y−d
(−1 + 2y − xy), d+ γ(y − d), sup
y−d<x≤1
(1− 2x+ xy)
]
= max[−1 + 2y, d+ γ(y − d), 1− (2− y)(y − d)],
d ≤ y ≤ 1. (A.2)
We note that for y = d the interval 0 ≤ x < y − d that appears above is empty and the
corresponding argument of the maximum operator is absent. Of the three arguments of
the maximum in the last line, the first one has been obtained for x∗(y) = 0; the second
and third ones both for x∗(y) = y − d, which corresponds to the line of discontinuity.
The third argument does not exist as a maximum but is a supremum.
It may be verified with the aid of expression (4) that d + γ(y − d) is never larger
than either −1 + 2y or 1− (2− y)(y− d). Of these, the former increases and the latter
decreases with y on [d, 1]. Their point of intersection occurs at y = y∗ given by
y∗ =
1
2
[
4 + d−
√
8 + d2
]
. (A.3)
Upon combining the results of the two y intervals we therefore have
sup
x
G1(x, y) =


1 0 ≤ y ≤ d,
1− (2− y)(y − d) d ≤ y ≤ y∗,
−1 + 2y y∗ ≤ y ≤ 1.
(A.4)
This shows that supxG1(x, y) reaches its minimum as a function of y for y = y
∗. We
therefore have
inf
y
sup
x
G1(x, y) = − 1 + 2y∗
= d+ 3−
√
8 + d2, (A.5)
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the infy supx being realized for (x, y) = (x
∗(y∗), y∗) = (y∗ − d, y∗), which is a point on
the line of discontinuity. By similar methods but that we will not detail here one derives
the counterpart
sup
x
inf
y
G1(x, y) = d− 3 +
√
8 + d2. (A.6)
Eqs. (A.5) and (A.6) are the results stated in Eq. (8).
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